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Abstract
In this paper we point out some diffi-
culties in developing rationality mea-
sures of fuzzy preference relations, as
defined by Cutello and Montero in a
previous paper. In particular, we an-
alyze some alternative approaches,
taking into account that consistency
can not be viewed as an univoque
concept in a fuzzy framework, nei-
ther in the crisp context, where con-
sistency should not be necessarily
represented in terms of linear orders.
Keywords: Fuzzy Preferences, Ra-
tionality Measures, Decision Mak-
ing.
1 Introduction
In the classical decision theory, a wide class
of preference models have been introduced in
order to capture coherence, rationality or con-
sistency in the pairwise comparison: linear or-
ders and complete preorders, where both the
preference and indifference relations are tran-
sitive; semiorders, interval orders, semitransi-
tivity and quasitransitivity, where the strict
preference relation is transitive but the indif-
ference relation is not necessarily transitive;
and acyclicity, where no cycles are allowed
(see for instance [26] and [12]).
In the fuzzy framework, transitivity plays
again a crucial role in coherence modeling.
However, there exists a great variety of fuzzy
transitivity properties, each one offering a dif-
ferent consistency assumption (see, e.g., [15]).
The problem of studying consistency of fuzzy
preferences, and choosing the most appropri-
ate one in a given decision making problem,
may require much more effort than in the or-
dinary crisp case.
In fact, a key argument in [3] was that most
standard fuzzy transitivity conditions in lit-
erature were crisp in nature, i.e., they ei-
ther hold or not hold. But it is obvious
that some situations are extremely intransi-
tive while sometimes we only find small tran-
sitivity violations that can be in some way
bypassed in practice. We find these argu-
ments both in the crisp case and the fuzzy
case: a close enough transitive relation can
be reached, just by introducing very few mod-
ifications in decision maker preferences (see,
e.g., [20]. Consistency in most cases allows
different degrees, and it should be measured.
The axiomatic approach of [3, 4] was a first
proposal in this direction, proposing a partic-
ular family of conditions any rationality mea-
sure should verify. A rationality measure in
[3] was defined as a mapping
ρ : P(X)→ [0, 1]
where P(X) represents the universe of all pos-
sible fuzzy preference relations on a finite set
X of alternatives
µ : X ×X → [0, 1]
being µ(x, y) the degree to which alternative
x is weakly preferred to alternative y. Then,
ρ(µ) represents the degree of consistency of
µ, provided that such a mapping ρ verifies
certain conditions (see [3]):
1. Foundation (linear orders have the max-
imum degree of rationality).
2. Invariance (with respect to permutations
of alternatives).
3. Symmetry (with respect to dual opin-
ions).
4. Principle of persistent degree of rational-
ity (behavior with respect to new alter-
natives).
5. Regularity (with respect to preference
modifications).
Of course, many different rationality measures
can be defined, so a key problem is to find out
a way of building up a particular one, being
appropriated to the particular problem we are
facing to. However, a positive test of map-
pings satisfying the proposed definition was
missing in [3]. In this paper we propose to
translate the particular view of consistency
decision makers have in the crisp context into
every α-cut of their estimated fuzzy prefer-
ence, so we can offer an alternative analysis of
consistency fully based upon any given crisp
consistency, which needs not to be the family
of linear orders, as assumed in [3]. Hence, con-
sistency degrees will depend on the previous
choice of a particular family of crisp prefer-
ence structures (not necessarily the family of
all linear orders), to be taken as a basis for
a rationality analysis of fuzzy preference rela-
tions.
2 Crisp consistency
A first objective should be to fix the concept
of consistency within the crisp context.
We of course notice that the standard assump-
tion in the crisp framework is to assimilate
consistency to linear ordering, in such a way
that for every pair of alternatives x and y ei-
ther xPy or yPx hold, but not both, and then
we talk about strict preference. But we should
also point out that this is not the only avail-
able proposal. For example, quasitransitivity
imposes transitivity to strict preference, but
not to indifference (the famous sugar paradox
[16] is a nice argument, see also [19]).
In fact, as pointed out in [13], there are many
alternative definitions of consistency, each one
still allowing a rich enough decision making
model, fitting main restrictions of decision
makers. But the family of consistent crisp
preference relations may not be the family of
all linear orders (see [13] where it is argued
that decision makers may identify as consis-
tent only short chains of alternatives: if de-
cision makers can not deal with more than
seven alternatives at once, it is not clear at
all why the mathematical model should force
them to assume long linear orders that deci-
sion makers will never be able to check).
Following [13], we shall simply assume that
our decision maker has been able to define
what consistency is, by listing a family C(X)
of consistent crisp binary preference relations
(µ(x, y) ∈ {0, 1},∀x, y ∈ X, ∀µ ∈ C(X)), in
such a way that ρ(µ) = 1 if and only if µ ∈
C(X).
For example, invariance with respect permu-
tations of the set of alternatives seems a nat-
ural condition that can be assumed for our
family C(X) of consistent crisp preference re-
lations. But we also need to assure that such
a family is being built according to a rule, in
such a way that elements in C(X) are con-
nected by means of some unifying common
criteria (perhaps a recursive construction can
be tried, telling us how a new alternative can
be consistently added to any given consistent
crisp preference relation, as proposed in [5] in
a different context).
3 Strong and weak preferences
As already pointed out, consistency of strict
preference and consistency of indifference may
require each one a different model, even in the
crisp context. Main arguments can be trans-
lated into the fuzzy context, always taking
into account the whole fuzzy preference struc-
ture that contains information about strict
preference and indifference but also about in-
comparability (neither xRy nor yRx hold, see
[9], but also [21]). Consistency should be de-
veloped allowing both indifference and incom-
parability, although it is quite often assumed
in practice that they can not simultaneously
appear.
For example, suppose individuals who have to
show their crisp preferences among the alter-
natives of the set X = {x1, . . . , xn}, where
n ≥ 3. A way of introducing crisp preference
concepts is taking the strong (or strict) pref-
erence as primitive notion, through a binary
relation P , where xP y means “x is preferred
to y ” or “x is better than y ”. A basic as-
sumption for P is asymmetry: P ∩ P−1 = ∅.
In this case the indifference relation I can be
defined by absence of preference: x is indif-
ferent to y when neither x is preferred to y
nor y is preferred to x in such a way that
I = (P ∪ P−1)c = P c ∩ (P−1)c. Then, I is
reflexive and symmetric, and R = P ∪ I (the
weak preference relation) is complete. But
once asymmetry is being assumed in order to
assure the strict preference role, indifference
is fixed but incomparability can not be repre-
sented.
According to [18] and [7], we can use an index
dij for distinguish among the three possible
cases of preference and indifference between
xi and xj :
dij =

1, if xi P xj ,
0, if xi I xj ,
−1, if xj P xi.
Taking rij =
dij+1
2 , we have
rij =

1, if xi P xj ,
0.5, if xi I xj ,
0, if xj P xi.
We can therefore consider fuzzy binary rela-
tions as a generalization of the crisp ones by
considering the above indices rij , but now be-
longing into the unit interval [0, 1] instead of
the set {0, 0.5, 1}. If R is a fuzzy binary re-
lation on X with membership function
µR : X ×X −→ [0, 1]
we denote rij = µR (xi, xj). This value
rij has been interpreted in the literature in
mainly two ways (see [10]). For example,
some authors (e.g., [1, 24, 25]) understand rij
as the degree of certainty or confidence in the
(strict or weak) preference of xi over xj .
But for other authors rij denotes the in-
tensity in which xi is preferred to xj (e.g.,
[2, 10, 22, 23, 28]). Reciprocity is in this
framework a common hypothesis: rij + rji =
1 for all pair of alternatives xi, xj ∈ X. The
set of reciprocal fuzzy binary relations on X
will be denoted by R(X). But notice that
some authors (see, e.g., [2, 23]) propose reci-
procity with an exception: rii = 0 (these au-
thors assume that rij = 0.5 indicates indif-
ference between xi and xj , and since the al-
ternative xi must be indifferent to itself, it
should be rii = 0.5, just as happens under
reciprocity. Thus, as the mentioned authors
assert, rii = 0 is a convention).
Anyway, given α ∈ [0, 1], we can define the
α-cut of R ∈ R(X):
Pα = {(xi, xj) ∈ X ×X | rij ≥ α}
Analogously, for any α ∈ [0, 1) we can also
define another ordinary binary relations also
associated with R:
Pα = {(xi, xj) ∈ X ×X | rij > α}
Hence, xi Pα xj ⇔ rij ≥ α and, analogously,
xi Pα xj ⇔ rij > α.
We note that every reciprocal fuzzy binary re-
lation defines, in a natural way, a set of pref-
erence ordinary relations. In this case, Pα
and Pα are ordinary preference relations, for
each α ∈ (0.5, 1] and α ∈ [0.5, 1), respec-
tively. The indifference relations associated to
Pα (i.e., neither xi Pα xj nor xj Pα xi hold),
and Pα (i.e., neither xi Pα xj nor xj Pα xi
hold), can be respectively defined by
xi Iα xj ⇔ 1− α < rij < α
and
xi Iα xj ⇔ 1− α ≤ rij ≤ α.
Fuzzy binary relations generalize ordinary bi-
nary relations. However, no reciprocal fuzzy
binary relation is ordinary: from rii = 0.5
for all xi ∈ X, we have 0.5 ∈ µR (X × X);
hence, µR (X ×X) ⊆ {0, 1} is not being veri-
fied. Then, we say that R ∈ R(X) is crisp if
rij ∈ {0, 0.5, 1} for all xi, xj ∈ X ( rij = 0.5
implies rji = 0.5 and it is then being under-
stood that xi and xj are indifferent).
4 Max-∗ transitivities
Many alternative transitivity conditions can
be found in the fuzzy literature, in order to
assure some kind of consistency. Among those
transitivity definitions, the most frequent is
max-min transitivity:
rik ≥ min{rij , rjk} ∀xi, xj , xk ∈ X.
Such a definition can be easily generalized
by considering another t-norm instead of the
minimum operator (see, e.g., [14]): a t-norm
is a mapping
∗ : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
being monotonous, commutative, associative,
and verifying a particular boundary condition
(a ∗ 1 = 1 ∗ a = a, ∀a ∈ [0, 1]).
Being a fuzzy preference relation max-∗ tran-
sitive means that
rik ≥ rij ∗ rjk ∀xi, xj , xk ∈ X.
(see, e.g., [15] but also [20]).
We characterize below max-min transitivity
in the framework of the reciprocal fuzzy bi-
nary relations: the first item says us that this
property is a natural extension of transitiv-
ity to the fuzzy case; the second item justifies
why this property is called “max-min”. The
fourth item will shows us an undesirable side
effect of this property.
Proposition 1. For every R ∈ R(X) the
following statements are equivalent:
1. Pα is transitive for all α ∈ [0, 1].
2. rik ≥ max {min{rij , rjk} | xj ∈ X} for
all xi, xk ∈ X.
3. rik ≥ min{rij , rjk} for all xi, xj , xk ∈ X.
4. min{rij , rjk} ≤ rik ≤ max{rij , rjk} for
all xi, xj , xk ∈ X.
Proof: Obviously 2 and 3 are equivalent.
1 ⇒ 3: If α = min{rij , rjk}, we have
rij , rjk ≥ α. Then, xi Pα xj and xj Pα xk;
consequently, xi Pα xk, i.e.,
rik ≥ α = min{rij , rjk}.
3 ⇒ 4: We only need to justify the second
inequality. By hypothesis we have
rki ≥ min{rkj , rji}
for all xi, xj , xk ∈ X. Then,
−rki ≤ −min{rkj , rji} = max{−rkj , −rji}
and
rik = 1− rki ≤ 1 + max{−rkj , −rji} =
= max{1− rkj , 1− rji} = max{rjk, rij}
i.e., rik ≤ max{rij , rjk} for all xi, xj , xk ∈ X.
4⇒ 1: Suppose xi Pα xj and xj Pα xk; then,
rij , rjk ≥ α. By hypothesis we have
rik ≥ min{rij , rjk} ≥ α
i.e., xi Pα xk.
Therefore, if R ∈ R(X) is max-min transi-
tive, we have that
1. For each α ∈ (0.5, 1] the ordinary pref-
erence and indifference relations Pα, Iα
and Pα ∪ Iα are transitive.
2. For each α ∈ [0.5, 1) the ordinary pref-
erence and indifference relations Pα, Iα
and Pα ∪ Iα are transitive.
3. Paradoxically, if rij = rjk = 0.9, then
necessarily rik = 0.9. This aspect could
be considered as a drawback of the max-
min property. In this way some restric-
tions have been considered in the lit-
erature. “Weak” (or “restricted”) con-
ditions are considered by [28] and [6],
among others, when certain additional
hypotheses are required. In this paper
we consider preference intensities greater
than 0.5 (or greater than or equal to 0.5)
in order to avoid the mentioned draw-
back.
The next property, appearing in three equiv-
alent ways, is a restricted version of the max-
min transitivity. It has been considered un-
der the reciprocity assumption by [17] and [8],
among others, in the framework of the proba-
bilistic choice theory, with the name ofmoder-
ate stochastic transitivity , and by [28], within
the fuzzy decision theory, under the name of
fuzzy preference order .
Proposition 2. For every R ∈ R(X) , the
following statements are equivalent:
1. Pα is transitive for all α ∈ [0.5, 1].
2. rik ≥ max{min{rij , rjk} | xj ∈ X, rij ≥
0.5, rjk ≥ 0.5} for all xi, xk ∈ X.
3. (rij ≥ 0.5 and rjk ≥ 0.5) ⇒ rik ≥
min{rij , rjk} for all xi, xj , xk ∈ X.
In a similar way, 0.5 intensities can be ex-
cluded from the prerequisites, leading to the
next generalization of quasitransitivity within
the fuzzy framework.
Proposition 3. For every R ∈ R(X) the
following statements are equivalent:
1. Pα is transitive for all α ∈ (0.5, 1].
2. Pα is transitive for all α ∈ [0.5, 1).
3. rik ≥ max{min{rij , rjk} | xj ∈ X, rij >
0.5, rjk > 0.5} for all xi, xk ∈ X.
4. (rij > 0.5 and rjk > 0.5) ⇒ rik ≥
min{rij , rjk} for all xi, xj , xk ∈ X.
Now we introduce two classes of fuzzy tran-
sitivity properties, depending on binary op-
erations which allow enforcement of prefer-
ence intensities among preference-connected
triplets of alternatives.
Definition 1. Let R ∈ R(X) and ∗ a bi-
nary operation on [0.5, 1] (i.e., a ∗ b ∈ [0.5, 1]
for all a, b ∈ [0.5, 1]) satisfying commutativity
(a∗b = b∗a, for all a, b ∈ [0.5, 1]), monotonic-
ity (a′ ∗ b′ ≥ a ∗ b whenever a′ ≥ a and b′ ≥ b,
for all a, b ∈ [0.5, 1]) and continuity. Then
1. R is called moderate max-∗ transitive if
(rij ≥ 0.5 and rjk ≥ 0.5) ⇒ rik ≥
rij ∗ rjk for all xi, xj , xk ∈ X.
2. R is called moderate max-∗ quasitransi-
tive if (rij > 0.5 and rjk > 0.5) ⇒
rik ≥ rij ∗ rjk for all xi, xj , xk ∈ X.
Examples of binary operations verifying the
required conditions are: a ∗1 b = 0.5, a ∗2 b =
max{a + b − 1, 0.5}, a ∗3 b = max{ab, 0.5},
a ∗4 b = min{a, b}, a ∗5 b = a+b2 and a ∗6 b =
max{a, b}. An empirical study of the fulfill-
ment of moderate max-∗ transitivity with re-
spect to the above binary operations can be
found in [11] (see also [27]).
We note that if R is moderate max-max (max-
∗6) transitive, then rij = rjk = 0.5 ⇒ rik =
0.5 for all xi, xj , xk ∈ X; in other words, I0.5
is transitive.
5 Coherence measures
In the classical decision theory there are many
available models for rationality. Among the
great variety of preference structures we can
find in the literature (linear orders, complete
preorders, semiorders, interval orders, semi-
transitivity, quasitransitivity and acyclicity,
among others), at a first stage we propose
to concentrate our attention in three of them
(see, for instance, [26] and [12]). Given P be
an asymmetric ordinary binary relation on X
representing strong preference:
1. If P is transitive and I is antisymmetric
we call it linear order.
2. If P and I are transitive, we call it com-
plete preorder. It is worth to emphasize
that complete preorders satisfy the fol-
lowing properties (see, for instance, [12]):
(a) (xi P xj and xj I xk) ⇒ xi P xk
for all xi, xj , xk ∈ X.
(b) (xi I xj and xj P xk) ⇒ xi P xk
for all xi, xj , xk ∈ X.
3. If transitivity is imposed just to P , we
call it quasitransitive.
Since each strong ordinary preference relation
P onX can be considered as a crisp reciprocal
fuzzy binary relation R ∈ R(X) by means of
rij =

1, if xi P xj ,
0.5, if xi I xj ,
0, if xj P xi
we can define some key ordinary preference
structures through properties on R:
1. P is a linear order if and only if R is
moderate max-min quasitransitive and
rij ∈ {0, 1} for all xi, xj ∈ X.
2. P is a complete preorder if and only if R
is moderate max-max transitive.
3. P is quasitransitive if and only if R is
moderate max-min quasitransitive.
Now we introduce a way of defining a class
of coherence measures in the framework of re-
ciprocal fuzzy binary relations, taking into ac-





Then a fuzzy coherence measure should be a
mapping ρ : R −→ [0, 1] satisfying at least
the following properties (compare them with
those in [3]:
1. ρ(R) = 1 for all R ∈ C, being C a fixed
family of binary relations which decision
maker identifies as consistent.
2. Neutrality: Let
pi : {1, . . . , n} −→ {1, . . . , n}
be a bijection and R ∈ R(X). If Rpi is
defined by
rpiij = rpi(i)pi(j)
then ρ(Rpi) = ρ(R).
3. Reciprocity: Let R ∈ R(X). If R−1 is de-
fined by r−1ij = rji, then ρ(R
−1) = ρ(R).
4. Monotonicity: Let R,R′ ∈ R(X) such
that R′ and R coincides in X × X \
{(xi, xk), (xk, xi)}. If r′ik ≥ rik for each
xj such that r′ij = rij > 0.5 and r′jk =
rjk ≥ 0.5, then ρ(R′) ≥ ρ(R).
Let us suppose now an ordered list
T = {T1, . . . , Ts}
of moderate max-∗ transitivity (quasitransi-
tivity) properties, where Ti is associated with
the binary operation ∗i on [0.5, 1] such that
a ∗i b ≤ a ∗j b for all a, b ∈ [0.5, 1], whenever
i < j. Consequently, Tj implies Ti if i < j.
Lets consider w = (w1, . . . , ws) ∈ [0, 1]s a
vector of weights, such that w1+ · · ·+ws = 1.
Given R ∈ R(X), with pi(R) we denote
the rate of triplets of X satisfying the prop-
erty Ti; consequently, pi(R) is a relative
measure of the accomplishment of Ti. The
map p : R(X) −→ [0, 1]s assigns the vec-
tor of fulfillment rates of properties Ti to
each reciprocal fuzzy binary relation, p(R) =
(p1(R), . . . , ps(R)). Since the binary opera-
tions ∗i provide greater results when i in-
creases, the components of the vector p(R)
are ordered in a non-decreasing manner.
Definition 2. Given a list T of fuzzy tran-
sitivity properties, a vector of weights w and
a non-decreasing function ϕ : [0, 1] −→ [0, 1]
such that ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1) = 1, we define
the fuzzy coherence measure ρ : R −→ [0, 1]
associated with 〈T,w, ϕ〉 by
ρ(R) = w1 · ϕ(p1(R)) + · · ·+ ws · ϕ(ps(R)).
Now we show some simple examples of fuzzy
coherence measures by considering concrete
vectors of weights and functions ϕ.
Examples.
1. Absolute fulfillment of Ti ∈ T:
wj =
{
1, if j = i,
0, if j 6= i,
ϕ(x) =
{
1, if x = 1,
0, if x < 1.
In this case, ρ(R) = 1 if and only if R
satisfies Ti.
2. Relative fulfillment of Ti ∈ T:
wj =
{
1, if j = i,
0, if j 6= i, ϕ(x) = x.
Now ρ(R) is the rate of fulfillment of Ti.












1, if x = 1,
0, if x < 1.
In this case
s · ρ(R) = max{i | pi(R) = 1}
indicates the maximum index i such that
R satisfies Ti.










, ϕ(x) = x.
Now ρ(R) is the average of the rates of
fulfillment of the properties in T.
Of course, consistency can be addressed by
defining a certain distance in some way telling
us how close we are to a consistent binary re-
lation. This is an underlying argument in [3],
and indeed it allowed to get compositions and
mixtures of rationality measures (see [4]). But
apart from that rationality measure initially
proposed in [19], non binary (crisp) rational-
ity measures are difficult to be defined. Al-
ternatively, we can consider all α-cuts, and
evaluate the distribution of consistent crisp
relations, i.e., whether each one belongs to C.
6 Final comments
This paper points out practical difficulties
when the approach of [3] has to be developed.
In particular, we point out that consistency
should not be necessarily associated to lin-
ear ordering, but the decision maker has to
declare what should be understood as consis-
tency, by defining a family of crisp preference
relations. Distance to consistency of an ar-
bitrary fuzzy preference relation can be then
analyzed by means of its sequence of α-cuts
if compared to elements in that family repre-
senting crisp consistency.
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